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Exiting the EU presents the need for a major 
rethink in terms of the future aims, 
ambitions and conduct of British European 
strategy. As there is no precedent for a 
country choosing to leave the EU the 
consequences of departure for the UK’s 
foreign and security policy are uncertain 
and the impact on its role in Europe is 
indeterminate.  
 
Defining the ambitions of a post-EU UK 
foreign and security policy will be a major 
undertaking for the next decade and require 
a new UK European diplomatic strategy.1 
Through its current membership of the EU, 
Britain participates in a set of policies that 
structure relationships between the EU and 
other states and organizations involved in 


























of policies - covering trade, security 
(including defence), development and 
foreign policy will most likely be 
recalibrated. Alteration of Britain’s status in 
relation to the EU will also have the 
consequence of an extensive recalibration 
of its bilateral relationships with both its EU 
and non-EU European neighbours. 
  
The scope of the impact of Brexit on 
European foreign and security policy 
relationships will be determined by a 
number of factors and gives rise to 
prospective scenarios explored in this 
paper.  
 
Brexit as recalibration 
Negotiating the exit from the EU itself 
currently occupies extensive diplomatic and 
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political bandwidth for the UK. Aside from 
negotiating its own exit from the EU the UK 
also has to determine its own strategic 
objectives for its future relationship with the 
EU. The EU will remain the UK’s 
neighbour and most important market for 
goods and services for the foreseeable 
future. Consequently, the political and 
economic stability of the EU will be a first-
order concern for the UK.  
 
Membership of the EU has provided the UK 
with significant efficiencies for the UK in 
enabling it to address a wide range of policy 
issues via a multilateral format with 27 
other European countries. The EU has 
provided a forum for the resolution of 
interstate disagreements between its 
members, the ironing out of differences 
with other European states and the pursuit 
of collective policies and positions on issues 
of common concern. The architecture for a 
future EU-UK relationship should ideally 
allow the UK to continue to exercise 
participation in a wide range of EU policies 
and in addition to single market access. 
  
The current preoccupation is with Brexit as 
process (and understood in terms of the 
realisation of the provisions of Article 50 of 
the TEU) and the full codification of the 
issues agreed in the phase one of 
negotiations.  At present there has been little 
attention given in the UK to its broader 
European diplomatic strategy (the 
relationships with the individual EU 
member states) post-Brexit. It is reasonable 
to assume, however, that the UK will 
continue to seek to have influence on EU 
agenda setting and policy development. As 
a non-member state this will be on a very 
different basis. 
In beginning to think seriously about the 
future EU-UK and UK-member state 
relationships, there are three sets of scoping 
conditions to consider:  
 
- Timescale – Brexit, in its 
entirety, is at least a decade-long 
project; 
 
- Success/failure of Brexit – if the 
UK makes a ‘success’ of Brexit 
it will impact on the UK’s 
perception of the EU and vice 
versa; 
 
- UK Domestic politics – the 
UK’s relationship with the EU is 
the defining issue in the politics 
of the United Kingdom for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
Pre-Brexit to Brexit 
In looking at post Brexit scenarios it is 
worth considering the UK’s attitude, 
approach and key partnerships pre-Brexit 
and how these impact on the current and 
future position of the UK.  
 
The UK’s approach towards the EU has 
been through a re-calibration process since 
Conservative Party returned to power in 
2010. In retrospect the Blair-Brown period 
from 1997 until the global financial crisis 
was a period in which the UK appeared to 
have reached an equilibrium in its attitude 
towards European integration. Although 
remaining outside the Euro and Schengen, 
the UK was positively engaged with the EU 
and sought to build a positive forward 
thinking approach towards EU agenda 
issues alongside supporting bilateral 
relationships. In terms of key bilateral 
relationships the UK sought to create close 
relationships with both France and 
Germany (not entirely successfully); sustain 
an economic liberalization coalition within 
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the EU; and offer a countervailing approach 
to a deepening of European integration via 
the promotion of an enlarging EU. To 
pursue these objectives, the UK pursued a 
policy, dubbed by one commentator, of 
promiscuous bilateralism. This was 
building alliances by issue area rather than 
building enduring bilateral or trilateral 
strategic partnerships. 
 
The two governments led by David 
Cameron from 2010 onwards adopted a 
somewhat different approach in 
simultaneously seeking to ‘de-centre’ the 
EU in the UK’s approach towards foreign 
policy whilst also neglecting/antagonizing 
bilateral relationships in the EU as 
illustrated by its attitude towards the 
Eurozone and migration crises. 
Conservative Party and domestic electoral 
considerations were given priority over the 
UK’s foreign and European policy interests 
and which resulted in the (inevitable) 
decision to offer and then conduct the 
referendum on the UK’s future relationship 
with the EU. The post-2010 privileging of 
intra party political politics in the governing 
Conservative Party over the broader UK 
interests has continued since the UK EU 
referendum vote in June 2016. It looks set 
to continue until the next scheduled UK 
General Election in 2022. Furthermore, the 
intra-UK political order and the 
relationships between the Westminster, 
Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast 
administrations is now in a state of flux as a 
direct consequence of Brexit.  
 
Post-Brexit scenarios 
In considering the future scenarios for the 
UK’s future foreign and security 
relationships there is the need to consider 
the configuration of the UK’s relationship 
with the EU. The paradox for the UK is that 
in exiting the EU the latter will still be the 
most important determinant of the UK’s 
role in Europe. 
 
The Brexit process itself has already 
resulted in significantly diverging agendas 
between the UK and the EU. The current 
preoccupation (for the majority of member 
states) is the ‘exit’ agreement envisioned 
under Article 50. For the UK, a domestic 
political preoccupation is the content and 
duration of transition arrangements post-
Brexit.  
 
The UK’s ambitions for its longer-term 
relationship with the EU are still rather 
under-developed and rest on proposition set 
out by the Prime Minister in her Lancaster 
House and Florence speeches.2 The 
envisioned deep and special relationship is, 
however, an aspiration rather than a fully 
articulated proposal. The EU itself has also 
yet to outline its own alternative vision as it 
wants to maintain a focus on the Article 50 
process interpreted in a sequenced fashion 
and conditional on the delivery of the 
narrowly drawn mandate currently being 
pursued by the European Commission 
negotiator on behalf of the EU27. 
 
Brexit-sclerosis scenario 
In the long term the most stable and 
mutually beneficial outcome is that Post-
Brexit the UK and EU should seek a 
Strategic Partnership focusing on markets, 
people and security.3 However, at present 
there are greater grounds for pessimism 
than optimism that this is achievable. This 
primarily because of the political 
environment in the UK does not extend 
much beyond domestic political naval 
gazing. Consequently, the near-term 
scenario for the remaining EU member 
states might be managing the UK’s 
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domestic preoccupation as a hard Brexit 
bites. A Brexit-sclerosis challenge may 
present itself to the 27: a domestic political 
and economic stagnation that sees the UK 
turn inward focusing on its own challenges. 
The consequences of which are uncertainty 
and dislocation in UK European policy. 
 
Phoenix Britain scenario 
An alternative scenario (currently a low 
probability prospect) is that Britain and the 
EU27 find themselves in a ‘hard Brexit’ 
situation but one that works to the UK’s 
advantage rather than its detriment. Little 
attention appears to have been given in the 
27 member states to a scenario in which the 
UK departs the EU with no formal Article 
50 agreement and with economic 
consequences that are tolerated by the 
British public. This is a scenario that could 
be dubbed Phoenix Britain. Needless-to-
say the challenge for the 27 (individually 
and collectively) is the alternative vision 
that such an apparently low-cost EU exit 
presents to EU membership. The UK then 
becomes a potential competitor model for 




Setting both these two scenarios to one side 
perhaps a more likely outcome is a 
continuation of the current Brexit-grind. 
This is sets of prolonged negotiations and 
transition(s) until there is an eventual modus 
vivendi and modus operandi that satisfies 
the EU and the UK. 
 
UK European strategy post-Brexit 
It is the outcome of this process and degree 
to which the UK is integrated with the EU’s 
internal and external policies post-Brexit 
and post-transition which will determine the 
importance of the future EU-UK 
relationship. Obviously it is also the EU-
UK relationship that will be the key 
determinant of how the UK and EU member 
states bilateral, trilateral, mini- and 
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The ‘markets’ and ‘people’ aspects of the 
UK’s relationship with the individual EU 
member states post-Brexit will be heavily 
conditioned by the nature of the single 
market access and trade relationship that 
exists between the UK and the EU. The only 
certainly at present is that the UK moves 
from a member states to a third country in 
terms of its relationship to the EU legal 
framework and institutional order. The 
costs/benefits of existing EU-third country 
relationships have already been rehearsed at 
length and the spectrum has frequently been 
presented in the UK as a choice on a 
spectrum between an EEA (minus) 
relationship or an CETA (plus) relationship.  
Consequently, post-EU membership the 
UK strategic relationship towards the EU’s 
remaining member states will likely migrate 
between that of an off-shore and on-shore 
balancer. By this is meant that the UK’s 
strategy will be to seek to influence the EU 
by favouring different depths of 
relationship with different member states 
across different issue areas in an attempt to 
maximise influence over the EU agenda 
whilst seeking to minimise the domestic 
political and direct financial costs of EU-
engagement. In such areas as single market 
regulation, Eurozone management, and EU 
trade policy the UK will seek to influence 
off-shore by seeking proxy influence on EU 
policy formation through member state 
national capitals and in Brussels.  
 
In other areas the UK may seek to be an on-
shore balancer. That is where direct 
tangible engagement by the UK with the EU 
where politically possible, where objectives 
appear to be of mutual advantage and if the 
financial costs (to the UK) are modest. 
Security and neighbourhood policy are 
indicative areas. 
 
The complexity of implementing such an 
off-shore/on-shore strategy for both the UK 
and the EU’s member states are highlighted 
in the current collaboration in the area of 
external relations. The UK’s current 
external relations, including foreign and 
security policy, but also encompassing a 
wider variety of areas including trade, aid, 
environment, energy, development policy, 
immigration, border, asylum, cross-border 
policing, justice policies are all currently 
intertwined with EU policies.  
 
The UK will maintain a national interest in 
influencing the development of EU policies 
in all of these areas. But dependant on the 
nature of the post-Brexit EU-UK agreement 
the UK is likely to have differential types of 
direct relationship with the EU in each of 
these different strands of external relations. 
And which could run from a high degree of 
integration to a much weaker relationship as 
a more detached observer. In many of these 
areas there is full community competence 
(i.e. trade policy) which would give the UK 
and member states limited scope for 
relationships outside the framework of the 
EU.  
 
In other areas, such as defence and security 
policy (and probably development policy), 
there is perhaps greater scope for state-to-
state bilateral, trilateral mini- and multi-
lateral relationships. The UK already has an 
existing set of security and defence 
relationships with other EU member states 
which outside the framework of the EU. 
These are strategic bilateral security 
relationships (exemplified by the 
relationship with France), bilateral 
operational military collaborations (i.e. 
Netherlands), NATO-determined 
relationships (such as the JEF) or 
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collaborations via coalitions of the willing 
(CJTF - Operation Inherent Resolve).  
 
Foreign and security policy Post Brexit 
As Theresa May made clear in both her 
Lancaster House and Florence speeches her 
Government’s objective is to replace the 
UK’s EU membership with a ‘deep and 
special partnership with the European 
Union.’ A considerable proportion of the 
Florence speech was devoted to ‘a new 
relationship on security’ alongside a new 
economic relationship. The Prime 
Minister’s proposal, set out in the Florence 
speech, was that the security relationship 
would be underpinned by a treaty between 
the UK and the EU. 
  
More detailed UK Government ambitions 
for broader foreign policy, security and 
defence policy relationship have been set 
out in two ‘future partnership’ papers on 
Foreign policy, defence and development 
and Security, law enforcement and criminal 
justice.4 Both papers stress the degree of 
shared values, objectives and threat 
perception between the UK and the EU. The 
thrust of the papers is that the UK has much 
to lose from being more detached from the 
EU.  
 
Neither of these documents, nor the Prime 
Minister’s proposal for a security treaty, 
have triggered detailed EU or member state 
responses. The EU27 position has been to 
maintain a focus on the Article 50 process, 
interpreted in a sequenced fashion, with 
discussions on a future relationship 
conditional on the delivery of the Article 
50-based mandate. 
  
The UK government’s aspiration to agree a 
treaty-based relationship on security is a 
serious declaration of intent. But the 
complex distribution of EU security policy 
- operating on the basis of different degrees 
of integration between the member states, 
pursued across different institutions (with 
differing roles for the European 
Commission, other EU agencies and 
member states) and based upon different 
EU treaty articles - throws up similar 
complexities as negotiating a future trade 
relationship. For the UK to seek the closest 
possible relationship with the EU and its 
member states on internal security, and 
especially on issues of crime, terrorism and 
borders, will mean particularly acute 
negotiating challenges if the UK is outside 
the EU’s institutions, legal order and 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).  Moreover, because additional 
elements of the UK’s external relations such 
as the environment, food security, energy 
and development policy - all of which 
contain security dimensions - are all 
currently intertwined with EU policies, the 
scope of an EU-UK security treaty could be 
impressively broad. 
  
Foreign and defence policy appear to 
present less formidable institutional and 
legal barriers than other areas of future EU-
UK security collaboration. The EU’s 
member states retain the preeminent role in 
foreign and defence cooperation. But the 
recent evolution of Brussels-based 
decision-making and implementation 
structures of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
present a ‘docking problem’ for a non-
member state.5 Only member states are 
members of the EU’s key foreign, security 
and defence decision-making bodies such 
as the Foreign Affairs Council and the 
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Non-member states have been granted a 
range of formats to share views and to 
facilitate collaboration on foreign policy 
issues and security missions outside of these 
decision-making bodies. But none of these 
existing arrangements are likely to prove 
sufficiently attractive to the UK as they do 
not allow for sufficient influence on EU 
policy formation (via direct participation in 
key institutions). They only allow for 
signing up to EU foreign policy positions 
and security and defence operations after 
decisions on content, scope and action have 
already been determined. This is essentially 
participation and partnership on a ‘take it or 
leave it’ basis.  
 
The position set out by Theresa May in her 
Florence speech envisages something rather 
different: “…it is vital that we work 
together to design new, dynamic 
arrangements that go beyond the existing 
arrangements that the EU has in this area - 
and draw on the legal models the EU has 
previously used to structure co-operation 
with external partners in other fields such as 
trade.” In short, her government appears to 
seek a higher degree of integration with the 
EU than has been realised with other states 
to date. 
  
Achieving such an ambitious goal depends 
on two key conditions. First, whether the 
EU’s member states share the scale of 
ambition for a security agreement. Second, 
and more crucially, whether the UK and the 
EU are able to reach the exit agreement 
envisioned by Article 50 covering the UK’s 
exit from the EU and terms for the 
negotiation of a post-membership 
relationship.  
 
The security treaty proposal is detached 
from any wider process of reflection on the 
objectives for the UK’s foreign, security 
and defence post-Brexit. The phrase 
‘Global Britain’ is being used by 
government ministers as shorthand for post-
Brexit foreign policy but with little 
articulation of proposals for its ambition or 
the degree it diverges from current policy. 
Agreeing a security treaty with the EU 
would be a major foreign and security 
policy commitment. As Brexit was not 
anticipated, it is not currently reflected in 
the UK’s current National Security Strategy 
(NSS) or in the last Strategic Defence and 
Security of Review (SDSR) completed in 
2015.6 The scope and scale of the security 
commitments made to the EU via the 
security treaty, if as ambitious as the Prime 
Minister’s Florence speech suggests, would 
need to be reflected in a future SDSR and 
NSS. The current national security 
capability review, which looks at the 
existing UK policy and the plans to support 
implementation of the current NSS, is a 
recognition of the consequences of Brexit 
for UK foreign and security policy. But the 
UK needs to conduct a broader evaluation 
of the ambition for its post-Brexit foreign 
and security policy, especially in the 
European neighbourhood where the EU is a 
significant payer and player. And evaluate 
how does the UK see itself fitting with 
existing EU policies? Does it seek a 
division of labour with the EU and/or 
outsourcing the delivery of policy 
objectives by aligning with existing EU 
policies? Are there other venues, such as the 
G7, the UN and NATO, where the UK 
could have more effective impact on EU 
policies than within an EU-UK structure? 
And how does the UK envision its future 
relationship with the EU if the remaining 27 
member states seek closer security and 
defence policy integration - something that 
the UK has previously resisted? 
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The new Privileged partners and 
(promiscuous) bilateralism 
Brexit will have implications for the UK’s 
wider bilateral and trilateral relationships 
with the remaining EU member states, other 
European states and outside Europe. 
Security and defence policy is likely to 
prove the most effective route for the UK in 
building privileged partnerships with EU 
member states outside the EU framework. 
However, this may prove to be 
circumscribed if the defence aspects of the 
EU’s Global Strategy (and especially 
PESCO) are brought fully into fruition.  
Consideration of the broader diplomatic 
relationship between the UK and EU 
member states outside the EU framework 
highlights the degree of complexity which 




The future triadic relationship between the 
UK, France and Germany will be of 
significance but its format and operation is 
perhaps the most difficult to predict because 
of the degree of political uncertainty present 
in each of these countries at the present 
time. A high degree of convergence 
between France and Germany on a 
prospective future agenda for the EU would 
be viewed with mixed feelings in London: 
the EU’s stability may be ensured but the 
UK may feel that differences between Paris 
and Berlin are to the UK’s advantage. As 
the relationship between the UK, France 
and Germany extends beyond EU issues 
(and with existing collaboration on 
European and international security and 
global economic governance) a new tri-




New bilateralisms and mini-lateralisms 
Outside of the relationship between the UK, 
France and Germany the UK will face a 
tension between the desire to maintain 
strong bilateral relationships with as many 
member states as possible whilst struggling 
(especially in its current condition of 
diminished diplomatic resources) to make 
each of the relationships feel ‘special’. 
Perhaps a more likely strategy is for the UK 
to pursue privileged partnerships in issue 
areas where bilateral interests are likely to 
remain stable but tactical or promiscuous 
bilateralism when required. An attractive 
proposition for the UK may be to seek 
formal political dialogue arrangements with 
configurations such as the Weimar 
Triangle, V4 or Nordic Union. 
 
Transition: the EU-UK foreign and 
security policy relationship 
The timetable for a ‘final status’ agreement 
between the EU and the UK is 
indeterminate. This means that 
consideration needs to be given to the 
foreign and security policy relationships in 
the period between the formal exit of the 
UK from the EU in March 2017 and 
agreement on the fine detail of a future EU-
UK relationship.7 
  
The EU and its member states need to make 
a decision as to the basis on which they see 
the UK connected as partner as a non-
member state during transition. In 
particular, the degree to which the UK 
might continue to participate in EU security 
and defence policies as a ‘privileged 
partner’ with the necessary legal and 
political arrangements in anticipation of 
‘final status’ EU-UK agreement. A reverse 
Denmark arrangement would see the UK 
fully opted into EU’s foreign and security 
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policy arrangements as the EU’s first non-
member state full participant. An 
alternatives are various degrees of 
downgrading or ‘lock out’ for the UK and 
treated as a non-privileged, non-member 
state associated with EU security, foreign 
and defence policies on similar terms as 
Norway (on foreign policy and defence). 
However, unlike Norway, as the UK is a 
non-Schengen state, the relationship with 
the EU member states on internal security 
issues would be most conditional on what 
form of Europol and information sharing 
collaboration is agreed to cover the 
transitional period.  
 
A ‘hard Brexit’ with the UK exiting the EU 
at the end of March 2019 without any 
transitional agreement in place would see 
the UK’s contributions to EU foreign policy 
making and CSDP cease abruptly as the 
legal and political basis for their 
continuation would have terminated. The 
UK would also disconnect from 
institutional and information sharing 
arrangements facilitating cross border 
security. Notable would be the loss of 
information sharing via the termination of 
access to data systems such as Schengen 
Information System (SIS) II and Prüm, 
together with the termination of access to 
the use of the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW). Such an abrupt departure from the 
formal structures of policy making would 




The paradox of the UK’s position post-
Brexit is that the EU (and its member states) 
may likely consume greater diplomatic and 
political bandwidth than was the case when 
the UK was an EU member state. As the 
‘Phase one’ of the Brexit negotiations has 
demonstrated the UK’s political and 
diplomatic energy is far more preoccupied 
with Brexit than that of the EU institutions 
and the overwhelming majority of EU 
member states. Beyond the scope of this 
paper is the future of UK-US relations 
which present another significant challenge 
for the UK. And whether the current heavy 
enmeshed UK-US diplomatic, defence and 
intelligence relationship is likely to be 
strengthened or weakened by Brexit. 
 
As the Brexit negotiations move into ‘Phase 
2’, and the nature of the future EU-UK 
relationship becomes the dominant 
preoccupation, the UK’s post-Brexit 
diplomatic ambitions will become clearer. 
This will also require the EU’s member 
states to clarify their own ambitions and 
expectations for their relationship with the 
UK. The effects of Brexit on the power, 
alliances and influence of European states is 
yet to get underway.  
 
 
Professor Richard G. Whitman, Associate 
Fellow Chatham House and Director, 
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